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Executive Secretary

9 June 83
Date

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SUBJECT:

DRAFT NSDD-United States Security Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia

CIA SOURCE INFORMATION ORIGINATOR		EXTERNAL SOURCE INFORMATION ORIGINATOR		
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90700

June 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
The Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

THE HONORABLE BERYL SPRINKEL
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
for Monetary Affairs

THE HONORABLE FRED C. IKLE
The Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy


THE HONORABLE GEORGE BRADLEY
Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy
for International Affairs

THE HONORABLE JOHN McMAHON
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VICE ADMIRAL ARTHUR MOREAU, USN
Assistant to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Draft NSDD - United States Security Strategy for
the Near East and Southwest Asia (S)

As promised at our May 25th meeting attached is a draft NSDD pursuant to NSSD-4. I would appreciate your comments and recommendations on this draft by c.o.b. 13 June 1983. For planning purposes, I think we should have a revised draft to discuss at an SIG meeting by the end of next week, and plan on an NSC meeting on this subject early in July. (S)


Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment:
as stated

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TOP SECRETDRAFT 5/31/83National Security Decision
Directive NumberUnited States Security Strategy for
The Near East and South Asia

The recent National Security Study, NSSD-4/82, reaffirmed the basic soundness of the purposes and objectives of our National Security Policy toward the Near East and South Asia. The derivative and complimentary regional security interests, objectives and strategy outlined in NSSD-4 are approved and restated herewith: (U)

U.S. Regional Interests

- to prevent the Soviet Union from attaining a position of hegemony in the region by deterring Soviet expansion and by supporting the sovereignty of all countries in the region. (S)
- to maintain continued access for the US and its principal allies to Gulf oil. (TS)

U.S. Regional Security Objectives

- to deter Soviet aggression and maintain readiness for combat if necessary. (S)
- to counter and reverse Soviet efforts to extend influence by other means. (TS)
- to protect US and Western access to adequate supplies of oil. (S)
- to ensure the security of Israel within defensible and internationally recognized borders. (S)
- to pursue a comprehensive lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the resolution of the Palestinian problem based upon the principles outlined by President Reagan on September 1, 1982. (U)
- to help resolve other regional conflicts that threaten our interests. (U)
- to strengthen regional stability by measures to improve economic conditions and indigenous defense capabilities. (U)
- to expand US influence with selected states in the region. (S)

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-- to limit the ability of unfriendly or hostile regimes to destabilize or subvert selected friendly countries in the region. (S)

-- to discourage proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities in the region. (S)

Threats to U.S. Interests and Objectives

The most serious threats to our vital interests and objectives in the region are the power, influence, and activity of the Soviet Union. The geographic proximity of the USSR, and its determination to interfere, directly and indirectly, with the internal complexion and external alignment of countries which border it compound the threats. In this regard, the improvements in the regular military forces of the Soviet Union poised for use in the region and the enhanced power projection capabilities available for use in the Near East and South Asia, pose a formidable challenge. In addition, the inimical regional policies and activities of governments, such as the fundamentalist regime in Iran, pose a clear challenge to the moderate oil producing countries. Finally, our vital interests could be directly threatened by internal unrest and upheaval in the moderate Arab countries. (S)

Intra-regional conflicts, such as the Iraq-Iran war and the Arab-Israel conflict pose serious threats to our vital interests. Other potential regional conflicts which would pose grave danger to US interests include another Indo-Pakistani war and renewed fighting between the PDRY on the one hand and either Oman or the YAR on the other. These conflicts threaten our interests by creating potential superpower confrontations, opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence in the region, the spread of violence and instability, and the estrangement of key regional states. (S)

Strategic Planning for the Near East and South Asia

The foregoing validation of our national security interests and objectives in the region provides the basis for refining and revising our regional strategy. To advance US interests requires a comprehensive political-military strategy which is premised on mutually reinforcing diplomatic, economic and security initiatives. This strategy must develop and exploit opportunities to strengthen the US strategic posture in the Near East and South Asia and weaken Soviet influence, while enhancing the perception of key regional states that cooperation with the US serves their national interests. The strategy is to include balanced use of the three key US assets as perceived in the region: (S)

-- the US ability to deter and counter Soviet aggression; (S)

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-- the unique capability among outside powers to take a leading role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; (S)

-- the technological, industrial, economic and military strength which the US can bring to bear to assist other countries. (U)

U.S. Strategic Concept

Beyond the defense of NATO's southern flank, the Eastern Mediterranean and its littoral, our near term military strategy and the derivative concept and operations plans for the Near East and South Asia should focus on defending the oil fields on the Arabian Peninsula, the transshipment points and the sea and air lines of communication to this theater. Until we have procured the requisite strategic mobility, supporting force structure and have assured access to the base facilities necessary to mount a robust forward defense of the Gulf region, our plans should exploit the existing and programmed capabilities of our forces and those of our friends and allies. Together with others, we must be ready to use military power first to deter Soviet aggression on receipt of strategic warning and secondly to interdict the movement of Soviet forces to the Gulf region. I also want to reaffirm this Administration's determination to block any military moves by the Soviets, their surrogates or any other powers which threaten US and allied access to the critical resources of the region. (TS)

Cooperation with Other Countries

Because our vital interests in this part of the world are essentially shared interests, we must redouble our efforts to obtain the cooperation of our allies and other friendly powers in the defense of the region. (TS)

-- NATO Allies and Japan. To demonstrate our solidarity and enhance deterrence we should seek assistance in the form of direct military contributions from our principal NATO allies with highly mobile and specialized military capabilities suitable to a variety of NE/SA scenarios, especially the UK and France. With regard to the potential contributions of the UK and France, we should be prepared to assist, as necessary, in the movement of their specialized forces to the region. In keeping with ongoing negotiations, the FRG and Japan should be asked to contribute by assisting in the improvement of infrastructure which would facilitate defense of the oil fields and the critical transshipment points. They should also be encouraged to increase security and economic assistance to poor but important countries such as Turkey, Sudan, Egypt and Pakistan. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Turkey. Because Turkey occupies a strategic position adjacent to Soviet invasion routes, our cooperation in contingency planning beyond the traditional NATO

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missions is an important priority. Our efforts to upgrade co-located operating bases should be strengthened and we should continue to explore other measures which would enhance the responsiveness of our forces. Moreover, the linkages between our operational plans for southern Europe and the Near East should be explicitly recognized in NATO planning. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Israel. I acknowledge that our ability to defend vital interests in the Near East and South Asia would be enhanced by the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, in recognition of Israel's strategic location, developed base infrastructure, and the quality and interoperability of Israeli military forces, we will undertake cooperative planning for major contingencies which threaten vital western interests. The emphasis should be on Israeli contributions which serve our military objectives in Soviet contingencies. This planning should commence immediately. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Arab Powers. Given the critical need for facilities access in the region and, in some instances, the potential of Arab military forces, we should continue and expand our cooperative planning with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan. We should also consider what potential role Lebanon might play in our strategy in the future. (TS)

-- Cooperation with Pakistan. Our efforts to promote cooperation with Pakistan to meet Soviet contingencies in the region must be pressed, including plans for joint exercises and access to facilities, bearing in mind the political and military challenges Pakistan faces. The precedent established by the invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan and the potential for future Soviet encroachments in areas such as Baluchistan should be discussed anew with the Pakistanis. We must stress the value of prior contingency planning and a program for Security Assistance which is rationalized with our own plans and capabilities. In this regard our plans should recognize the importance of Pakistan in the interdiction of Soviet LOCs to the Gulf and Arabian Sea. We should also continue with determination and clarity of purpose to discourage the further development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities. (TS)

-- Cooperation with India. Consistent with our goals for cooperation with Pakistan we should adopt a diplomatic strategy which more explicitly recognizes India's strategic importance in both regional and global terms. This strategy should have as its initial objective, the improvement of relations between India, the PRC and Pakistan and the gradual weakening of India's military dependency on the Soviet Union. To this end we must continue our efforts to broaden our economic and military ties with India including closer liaison between our military establishments. We must continue to reassure the Indian Government of our determination to resist Soviet expansion and to discourage regional disputes which can only rebound to the advantage of the Soviet Union. (TS)

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Implementation

I would like the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to prepare a comprehensive agenda of the preferred ways to implement the military and diplomatic strategies outlined above. A comprehensive examination of requirements for contingencies in this theater is needed to include prepositioning, communications, access to enroute and in-theater facilities as well as a detailed examination of the relationship between our own arms procurement policies and other Western arms sales. The work program should be developed and the reviews should be completed on a priority basis. Periodic reports should be submitted to me to describe progress and to discuss problems which may arise. (S)

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